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Abstract
Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants
from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two
donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient
because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the
other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to
someone waiting for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high
priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. There are stringent
legal/ethical constraints on how exchanges can be conducted. We explore how larger
scale exchanges of these kinds can be arranged eﬃciently and incentive compatibly, within
existing constraints. The problem resembles some of the ￿housing￿ problems studied in
the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while
live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, cadaver kidneys cannot. In addition to
studying the theoretical properties of the proposed kidney exchange, we present simulation
results suggesting that the welfare gains from larger scale exchange would be substantial,
both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match
quality of transplanted kidneys.
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11 Introduction
Transplantation is the preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease. There
are over 55,000 patients on the waiting list for cadaver kidneys in the U.S., of whom almost
15,000 have been waiting more than three years. By way of comparison, in 2002 there were
over 8,000 transplants of cadaver kidneys performed in the U.S. In the same year, about 3,400
patients died while on the waiting list, and another 900 became too ill to be eligible for trans-
plantation. In addition to transplants of cadaver kidneys, in 2002 there were also somewhat
over 6,000 transplants of kidneys from living donors, a number that has been increasing steadily
from year to year. See Table 1.
There is thus a considerable shortage of kidneys, compared to the demand. However, the
substantial consensus in the medical community remains ￿rmly opposed to allowing organs￿
even cadaveric organs￿to be bought and sold, and this is a felony under the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984, and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987.1) The present
paper considers ways to alleviate this shortage, and improve patient welfare, within the con-
straints of the current social and legal environment.
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 established the Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network (OPTN). Run by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), it has
developed a centralized priority mechanism for the allocation of cadaveric kidneys.
Transplants from live donors generally have a higher chance of success than those from
cadavers. The way such transplants are typically arranged is that a patient identi￿es a healthy
willing donor (a spouse, for example) and, if the transplant is feasible on medical grounds, it is
carried out. If the transplant from the willing donor is not feasible, the patient typically enters
(or remains on) the queue for a cadaver kidney, while the donor returns home.
Recently, however, in a small number of cases, additional possibilities have been utilized
when a transplant from a live donor and the intended recipient is infeasible. One of these, called
a paired exchange, involves two patient-donor couples, for each of whom a transplant from donor
to intended recipient is infeasible, but such that the patient in each couple could feasibly receive
a transplant from the donor in the other couple (Rapaport [1986], Ross et al. [1997]). This
pair of couples can then exchange donated kidneys. Compared to receiving cadaver kidneys
at an unknown future time, this improves the welfare of the patients. In addition, it relieves
the demand on the supply of cadaver kidneys, and thus potentially improves the welfare of
those patients on the cadaver queue. A small number of these two-couple operations have been
done, and the transplantation community has issued a consensus statement declaring them to
1There is, however, a steady stream of literature bothb yd o c t o r sa n db ye c o n o m i s t s ,c o n s i d e r i n gh o wt h e
shortage of organs might be alleviated by allowing their purchase and sale, and what eﬀects this might have.
See e.g. Nelson et al. [1993] for an argument in favor of the status quo, and e.g. Becker & Elias [2002] for an
argument in favor of a market. Recent Congressional testimony endorsing the status quo but suggesting that
empirical investigation of ￿nancial incentives might be in order can be found in Slade [2003].
2be ethically acceptable (Abecassis et al. [2000]).2
Another possibility is an indirect exchange (or list exchange) involving an exchange between
one incompatible patient-donor couple, and the cadaver queue (Ross & Woodle [2000]). In this
kind of exchange, the patient in the couple receives high priority on the cadaver queue, in return
for the donation of his donor￿s kidney to someone on the queue.3 This improves the welfare of
the patient in the couple, compared to having a long wait for a suitable cadaver kidney, and it
bene￿ts the recipient of the live kidney, and others on the queue who bene￿tf r o mt h ei n c r e a s e
in kidney supply due to an additional living donor. However Ross and Woodle note that his
may have a negative impact on type O patients already on the cadaver queue, an issue studied
by Zenios, Woodle, & Ross [2001], to which we shall return.
In contrast to the system for cadaveric organs, and despite the growing interest in at least
small scale exchanges involving living donors, there is no national system, or even an organized
registry at any level, for managing exchanges of kidneys from live donors. However, individual
hospitals are beginning to think about larger scale living donor exchanges. As this paper
was being written, the ￿rst three-couple kidney transplant exchange in the United States was
reported at Johns Hopkins Comprehensive Transplant Center in Baltimore, among three couples
for whom no two-couple transfer was feasible (Olson, August 2, 2003). In the present paper
we will consider how such a system of exchanges might be organized, from the point of view
of achieving eﬃciency, and providing consistent incentives to patients, donors, and doctors,
and what its welfare implications might be. We will see that the bene￿ts of wider exchange
accrue not only to the parties to the exchange. The resulting increase in live organ donation
also bene￿ts patients waiting for cadaver kidneys, including type O patients. The design we
propose is partly inspired by the mechanism design literature on ￿house allocation,￿ and is
intended to build on and complement the existing practices in kidney transplantation. In this
respect and others it is in the modern tradition of engineering economics (see Roth [2002])
as applied to other problems of allocation, such as labor market clearinghouses (see Roth &
Peranson [1999]), or auctions (see Milgrom [forthcoming]), in which practical implementation
often involves incremental change in existing practices.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Kidney Transplantation: End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is a fatal disease unless treated
with dialysis or kidney transplantation. Transplantation is the preferred treatment. Two ge-
2UNOS also published a legal opinion that such exchanges do not violate the NOTA
(http://www.asts.org/eze￿les/UNOSSection 301 NOTA pdf).
3Priority on the cadaver queue is actually a bit complex, as queues are organized regionally, and consist of
multiple queues, on which priority is determined by a scoring rule that gives points for how well matched the
available kidney is to each patient, how long the patient has been waiting, etc. Giving high priority on the
queue could be implemented by giving an appropriate number of points in the scoring rule.
3netic characteristics play key roles in the feasibility and success of a kidney transplant. The
￿rst is the ABO blood-type: There are four blood types A, B, AB and O. Absent other compli-
cations, type O kidneys can be transplanted into any patient; type A or type B kidneys can be
transplanted into same type or type AB patients; and type AB kidneys can only be transplanted
into type AB patients. (So type O patients can only receive type O kidneys.) The second ge-
netic characteristic is tissue type, also known as HLA type: HLA type is a combination of six
proteins. As the HLA mismatch between the donor and the recipient increases, the likelihood
of graft (i.e. transplanted organ) survival decreases (Opelz [1997]). HLA plays another key
role in transplantation through the pre-transplant ￿crossmatch￿ test. Prior to transplantation,
the potential recipient is tested for the presence of preformed antibodies against HLA in the
donor kidney. The presence of antibodies, called a positive crossmatch,e ﬀectively rules out
transplantation.
When a cadaveric kidney becomes available for transplantation, the priority of each patient
on the waiting list is determined by a point system based on factors including the blood-type,
HLA antigen-match, time spent on the waiting list, the region the kidney is harvested, etc.
and the kidney is oﬀered to the patient with the highest priority. If that patient declines, the
kidney is oﬀered to the patient with the next highest priority, and so on. Living donor kidney
grafts have superior survival rates (and their availability can also avoid the long waiting time
for a cadaver kidney). However potential living donors can be eliminated from consideration
due to incompatibility of the potential donor kidney with the intended recipient.
To minimize the elimination of physically eligible volunteer kidney donors on the basis of
immunologic incompatibilities, Rapaport [1986] proposed the creation of a living donor pool
for paired exchange. Ross et al. [1997] again proposed to increase the supply of living kidney
donations by using kidneys from living incompatible donors through an exchange arrangement
between two pairs. In 2000, UNOS initiated pilot testing of such programs.
Another exchange program is the indirect exchange program (Ross & Woodle [2000]): A po-
tential donor who is incompatible with his intended recipient donates his kidney to the cadaveric
waiting list and his paired recipient will receive priority for the next compatible cadaveric kid-
ney. There is widespread agreement in the transplantation community that indirect exchange
can harm type O patients who have no living donors. First, they will be losing their priority to
type O patients whose incompatible donors donate to the cadaveric pool, and second, very few
type O living kidneys will be oﬀered to their pool since a type O donor can directly donate to
his intended recipient unless there is a positive crossmatch. Despite this widespread concern,
many transplant centers have also cautiously started pilot indirect exchange programs since
2000. For example, in UNOS Region 1 (New England), consisting of 14 transplant centers and
2 Organ Procurement Organizations, 4 paired exchanges and 17 indirect exchanges have been
conducted from 2001 through 2003 (personal communication).
Mechanism Design: We will extend results in the mechanism design literature, which we ￿rst
quickly review. Shapley & Scarf [1974] modeled a￿ h o u s i n gm a r k e t ￿c o n s i s t i n go fna g e n t se a c h
4of whom is endowed with an indivisible good, a ￿house.￿ Each agent has preferences over all
the houses, and there is no money in the market, trade is feasible only in houses. They attribute
to David Gale the ￿top trading cycle￿ algorithm that produces a house allocation in the core
of the market. The algorithm works as follows: Each agent points to her most preferred house
(and each house points to its owner). There is at least one cycle in the resulting directed graph.
In each such cycle, the corresponding trades are carried out, i.e. each agent in the cycle receives
the house she is pointing to, and these agents and houses are removed from the market. The
process continues (with each agent pointing to her most preferred house that remains on the
market) until no agents remain, and the ￿nal allocation is the one in which each agent receives
the house with which she left the market. When all preferences are strict, the procedure yields
a unique outcome (Roth & Postlewaite [1977]) and truthful preference revelation is a dominant
strategy (Roth [1982]).
Note that paired kidney exchanges similarly seek the gains from trade among patients with
willing donors, but (with the recent Johns Hopkins 3-pair exchange being a notable exception)
mostly among just two pairs. In the kidney exch a n g et ob ec o n s i d e r e db e l o w ,i fw ec o n s i d e r
exchange only among patients with donors, the properties of the housing market model essen-
tially carry over unchanged, if we assume that donors￿ preferences are aligned with those of
their intended recipient. We will also assume that all surgeries in a given cycle are carried out
simultaneously, which is the current practice, since a donor￿s willingness to donate a kidney
might change once her intended recipient received a transplant.
However the kidney transplant environment consists not just of patients with donors, but
also patients without donors, and cadaver kidneys not tied to any speci￿cp a t i e n t . A b d u l k a -
diroø glu & S¤ onmez [1999] studied housing allocation on college campuses, which is in some
respects similar: A set of rooms must be allocated to a set of students by a centralized hous-
ing oﬃce. Some of the students are existing tenants each of whom already occupies a room
and the rest of the students are newcomers. In addition to occupied rooms, there are vacant
rooms. Existing tenants are entitled to keep their current rooms but may also apply for other
rooms. Mechanisms used on a number of college campuses do not ensure the participation of
existing tenants, and result in eﬃciency loss. This is the motivation for the generalization of
the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroø glu & S¤ onmez [1999], which
they called you request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT): Each student reports his
strict preferences over all rooms and an ordering of agents is randomly chosen. For any given
preference list and ordering, the outcome is obtained as follows: (1) Assign the ￿rst student
his top choice, the second student his top choice among the remaining rooms, and so on, until
someone requests the room of an existing tenant who is yet to be served. (2) Whenever that
happens modify the remainder of the ordering by moving the existing tenant to the beginning
of the line and proceed with the procedure. (3) If at any point a cycle forms, it is formed by
exclusively existing tenants and each of them requests the room of the tenant who is next in
the cycle. In such cases remove all students in the cycle by assigning them the rooms they
5request and proceed with the procedure. The key innovation here is that an existing tenant
whose current room is requested is upgraded to the ￿rst place in the line of agents remaining
unassigned, before his room is allocated. As a result the YRMH-IGYT mechanism assures
every existing tenant a room that is no worse than his own. Therefore existing tenants do not
have any reason not to enter the market and consequently the eventual allocation is Pareto
eﬃcient. Note that the idea of upgrading an existing tenant whose current room is requested
to the top of the line was also invented by the transplantation community in the form of an
indirect exchange program: When a potential donor donates his kidney to the highest priority
patient in the waiting list, his intended recipient is upgraded to the top of the waiting list.
Note again that what prompted the introduction of simple kidney exchange programs was
the loss of volunteer kidney donors because of immunologic incompatibilities. Under these
exchange programs, a potential donor who is incompatible with his intended recipient is given
the incentive to go ahead with the donation, because his donation makes it possible for his
intended recipient to receive a compatible kidney. Similarly, the potential eﬃciency loss in
the campus housing problem is that some rooms might fail to be traded, even when welfare
enhancing trades are possible. The YRMH-IGYT is an attempt to address that problem in the
housing context. We next consider how it must be adapted to kidney exchange.
3 Kidney Exchange and the Top Trading Cycles and
Chains (TTCC) Mechanism
While there are clear similarities between house allocation and kidney exchange, there are
also important diﬀerences. The counterpart of an existing tenant and his room is a donor-
recipient pair, which we denote by (ki,t i). We will often refer to donor ki as kidney ki,a n d
recipient ti as patient ti. In the context of house allocation with existing tenants, there are also
newcomers, none of whom owns a speci￿c house, and vacant houses, none of which is owned
by a speci￿c student. The counterpart of newcomers are patients who have no living donors,
and the counterpart of vacant houses are cadaveric kidneys which are not targeted for speci￿c
patients. This analogy reveals one important diﬀerence between the two models: In the house
allocation model, the set of vacant houses is known. In the kidney exchange problem, it is
not clear which cadaveric kidneys will be available, when they will be available, etc. Therefore
while occupied houses and vacant houses are simultaneously allocated under the YRMH-IGYT
mechanism, this is not possible in the context of kidney exchange. Instead, patients with live
donors who are not themselves allocated a live donor kidney will be assigned to the cadaver
queue (with a priority re￿ecting whether their donor￿s kidney was donated to someone on the
queue).
Let K denote the set of living donor kidneys at a particular time. While patients and their
doctors may de￿ne their preferences over kidneys as they wish, here we consider, for speci￿city,
6the preferences that come from maximizing the probability of a successful transplant. Given
any patient, part of K is outside the feasible set due to ABO blood-type incompatibility or a
positive crossmatch. Among feasible kidneys, HLA match (Opelz [1997]), donor age, kidney
size, etc. play a signi￿cant role in the graft survival. Therefore patients have heterogenous
preferences over compatible kidneys. In what follows we will consider all preferences to be
strict. If only direct exchanges among donor-recipient pairs are considered, one can directly
use Gale￿s Top Trading Cycles mechanism. However this will not allow for indirect exchanges.
We will need to modify the model and the mechanism to allow for this possibility. Since the
supply of speci￿c cadaveric donor kidneys is not predictable, a patient who wishes to trade his
donor￿s kidney in return for a priority in the cadaveric kidney waiting list is receiving a lottery.
Taking this into consideration the patient, doctor, and donor can decide whether this option is
acceptable and if so, where it ranks in the patient￿s preferences.
Given a patient ti,l e tKi ⊂ K denote the set of living donor kidneys that are compatible
with patient ti.L e t w denote the option of entering the waiting list with priority re￿ecting
the donation of his donor￿s kidney ki,a n dPi denote his strict preferences over Ki ∪ {ki,w}.
F o ro u rp u r p o s e st h er e l e v a n tp a r to fPi is the ranking up to kidney ki or w, whichever ranks
higher. If patient ti ranks kidney ki at the top of his preferences that means he and his donor
do not wish to participate in an exchange. If patient ti ranks ki on top of w that means he and
his donor do not consider exchanging kidney ki with a priority in the cadaveric kidney waiting
list.
We can now formalize a (static) kidney exchange problem consisting of a set of donor-
recipient pairs {(k1,t 1),...,(kn,t n)}, a set of compatible kidneys Ki ⊂ K = {k1,...,k n} for
each patient ti, and a strict preference relation Pi over Ki ∪ {ki,w} for each patient ti.T h e
outcome of a kidney exchange problem is a matching of kidneys/waitlist option to patients
such that each patient ti is either assigned a kidney in Ki ∪ {ki} or the waitlist option w,a n d
no kidney can be assigned to more than one patient although the waitlist option w can be
assigned to several patients. A kidney exchange mechanism selects a matching for each kidney
exchange problem. We are almost ready to introduce the Top Trading Cycles and Chains
(TTCC) mechanism, a generalization of the TTC mechanism, for kidney exchange. First we
give a few de￿nitions and observations to facilitate the description of the mechanism.
3.1 Cycles and w-Chains
The mechanism relies on an algorithm consisting of several rounds. In each round each patient
ti points either towards a kidney in Ki ∪ {ki} or towards w, and each kidney ki points to its
paired recipient ti.
A cycle is an ordered list of kidneys and patients (k0
1,t 0
1,k0
2,t 0
2,...,k0
m,t 0
m) such that kidney
k0
1 points to patient t0
1,p a t i e n tt0
1 points to kidney k0
2, ...,k i d n e yk0
m points to patient t0
m,
and patient t0
m points to kidney k0
1. Cycles larger than a single pair are associated with direct
7exchanges, very much like the paired-kidney-exchange programs, but may involve more than
t w op a i r s ,s ot h a tp a t i e n tt0
1 is assigned kidney k0
2,p a t i e n tt0
2 is assigned kidney k0
3, ...,p a t i e n t
t0
m is assigned kidney k0
1. N o t et h a te a c hk i d n e yo rp a t i e n tc a nb ep a r to fa tm o s to n ec y c l e
and thus no two cycles intersect.
A w-chain is an ordered list of kidneys and patients (k0
1,t 0
1,k0
2,t 0
2,...,k0
m,t 0
m)s u c ht h a t
kidney k0
1 points to patient t0
1,p a t i e n tt0
1 points to kidney k0
2, ...,k i d n e yk0
m points to patient
t0
m,a n dp a t i e n tt0
m points to w. We refer to the pair (k0
m,t 0
m) whose patient receives a cadaver
kidney in a w-chain as the head and the pair (k0
1,t 0
1) whose donor donates to someone on the
cadaver queue as the tail of the w-chain. W-chains are associated with indirect exchanges but
unlike in a cycle, a kidney or a patient can be part of several w-chains. One practical possibility
is choosing among w-chains with a well-de￿ned chain selection rule, very much like the rules
that establish priorities on the cadaveric waiting list. The current pilot indirect exchange
programs in the U.S. choose the minimal w-chains, consisting of a single donor-recipient pair,
but this may not be eﬃcient. Selection of longer w-chains will bene￿t other patients as well and
therefore the choice of a chain selection rule has eﬃciency implications (see Theorem 1). Chain
selection rules may be also used for speci￿c policy objectives such as increasing the in￿ow of
type O living donor kidneys to the cadaveric waiting list. Whenever w-chain (k0
1,t 0
1,...,k0
m,t 0
m)
is selected in the algorithm, patient t0
1 is assigned kidney k0
2,p a t i e n tt0
2 is assigned kidney k0
3,...,
patient t0
m−1 is assigned kidney k0
m,p a t i e n tt0
m receives high priority for the next compatible
kidney in the cadaveric waiting list, and kidney k0
1 is either oﬀered to the cadaveric waiting list
or to another patient with a paired donor.
Lemma 1 Consider a graph in which both the patient and the kidney of each pair are distinct
nodes as is the waitlist option w. Suppose each patient points either towards a kidney or w, and
each kidney points to its paired recipient. Then either there exists a cycle or each pair is the
tail of some w-chain.
We can now introduce the TTCC mechanism. Because the exchange mechanism interacts
with many parts of the kidney transplant environment, it will clarify the discussion to start
by indicating which parts of the environment we take as ￿xed for our present purpose. First,
we take the operation of the cadaver queue as ￿xed. The cadaver queue can be thought
of as a stochastic arrival process of cadavers and patients, interacting with a scoring rule that
determines which patients are oﬀered which cadaver kidneys. We also take as ￿xed how patients
whose donors donate a kidney to someone on the queue are given high priority on the queue,
e.g. by being given points in the scoring rule.4 We also take as given the size of the live kidney
4Depending on how this priority is given, patients may need to be aware of the current population of the
queue to evaluate the desirability of the w option. Liran Einav and Muriel Niederle have shared with us
interesting ideas about how to further model the desirability of the w option dynamically, taking into account
that others may enter the queue with high priority, but we will not pursue this here.
8exchange, i.e. the set of patient-donor pairs is taken to be ￿xed. In practice, the set of patient-
donor pairs will grow as the geographic area served by the kidney exchange is increased, or as
the time between exchanges is increased. A larger pool of possible exchanges will increase the
potential eﬃciency gains that can be realized by exchange, but will also increase the size of the
trading cycles/w-chains that might be needed to achieve these eﬃciencies. We will keep track
of both of these when we report simulations. Both the operation of the cadaver queue, and
the frequency and scope of the kidney exchange will in￿uence patients￿ ￿reservation utility,￿
i.e. how they compare various opportunities ford i r e c to ri n d i r e c te x c h a n g et ot h eo p t i o no f
not making any exchange now, but waiting for a future opportunity. Patients can express this
reservation utility by where they rank their own donor in their preferences.
3.2 The Exchange Mechanism
For the mechanism de￿ned below, we assume that when one among multiple w-chains must be
selected, a ￿xed chain selection rule is invoked. We will consider a number of such rules, and
their implications for incentives, eﬃciency, and equity.
Throughout the procedure kidneys are assigned to patients through a series of exchanges.
Some patients and their assigned kidneys will be immediately removed from the procedure,
while others will remain with their assignments but they will assume a passive role. So at any
point in the procedure, some agents may no longer be participants, some participants will be
active, and the others passive.
For a given kidney exchange problem, the TTCC mechanism determines the exchanges as
follows:
1. Initially all kidneys are available and all agents are active. At each stage of the procedure
each remaining active patient ti points to his most preferred remaining unassigned kidney
or to the waitlist option w, whichever is more preferred, each remaining passive patient
continues to point to his assignment, and each remaining kidney ki points to its paired
recipient ti.
2. By Lemma 1, there is either a cycle, or a w-chain, or both.
(a) Proceed to Step 3 if there are no cycles. Otherwise locate each cycle and carry out
the corresponding exchange (i.e. each patient in the cycle is assigned the kidney he
is pointing to). Remove all patients in a cycle together with their assignments.
(b) Each remaining patient points to his top choice among remaining kidneys and each
kidney points to its paired recipient. Locate all cycles, carry out the corresponding
exchanges, and remove them. Repeat until no cycle exists.
3. If there are no pairs left, we are done. Otherwise by Lemma 1, each remaining pair is
the tail of a w-chain. Select only one of the chains with the chain selection rule.T h e
9assignment is ￿nal for the patients in the selected w-chain. The chain selection rule also
determines whether the selected w-chain is removed and the associated exchanges are
all immediately assigned (including the kidney at the tail, which is designated to go to a
patient on the cadaver queue), or if the selected w-chain is kept in the procedure although
each patient in it is passive henceforth.5
4. After a w-chain is selected, new cycles may form. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 with the remaining
active patients and unassigned kidneys until no patient is left.
At the end of the procedure, each patient with a living donor is assigned a kidney (or a high
priority place on the waiting list). However that does not necessarily mean each of these patients
receives a transplant. In particular a minimal cycle (ki,t i) consisting of a single patient-donor
pair may be a pair that was not oﬀered a suﬃciently desirable kidney in the current exchange,
and chooses to wait in the hope of exchanging for a high quality living donor kidney the next
time the exchange is run, after new donors have entered the system.
Example 1: Consider a kidney exchange problem with 12 pairs (k1,t 1),...,(k12,t 12) with
preferences as follows:
t1 : k9 k10 k1 t7 : k6 k1 k3 k9 k10 k1 ω
t2 : k11 k3 k5 k6 k2 t8 : k6 k4 k11 k2 k3 k8
t3 : k2 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8 ω t9 : k3 k11 ω
t4 : k5 k9 k1 k8 k10 k3 ω t10 : k11 k1 k4 k5 k6 k7 ω
t5 : k3 k7 k11 k4 k5 t11 : k3 k6 k5 k11
t6 : k3 k5 k8 k6 t12 : k11 k3 k9 k8 k10 k12
Suppose that patients are ordered in a priority-list based on their indices starting with the
patient with the smallest index. We use the following chain selection rule: Choose the longest
w-chain. In case the longest w-chain is not unique, choose the w-chain with the highest priority
patient; if the highest priority patient is part of more than one, choose the w-chain with the
second highest priority patient, and so on. Keep the selected w-chains until the termination.
The execution of the TTCC mechanism is given in the following ￿ve ￿gures:
[Figures 1-5 about here]
The ￿nal matching is
ˆ
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
k9 k11 k2 k8 k7 k5 k6 k4 ω k1 k3 k10
!
. ♦
5The relevance of the last point is the following: Whenever a w-chain (k0
1,t 0
1,...,k 0
m,t 0
m) is selected, even
though the assignments of all patients in the w-chain are ￿nalized, the kidney k0
1 at the tail of the w-chain can
be utilized in two possible ways: It can immediately be oﬀered to the waiting list (in which case the w-chain is
removed) or it may be made available to the remaining patients as the process continues and hence the selected
w-chain may possibly grow later on, although the patients already in it are not aﬀected.
10It is worth emphasizing that the chain selection policy does not aﬀe c tap a t i e n tw h oi sa tt h e
head of a chain: Since he points to the waitlist option, he will eventually be selected regardless
of the chain selection rule. However whether his intended donor￿s kidney is oﬀered to the
cadaveric waiting list or another patient with a living donor depends on the rule. Depending
on policy priorities, one may consider adopting a number of alternative chain selection rules.
For example:
a. Choose minimal w-chains and remove them.
b. (c.) Choose the longest w-chain and remove it (keep it). If the longest w-chain is not unique
then use a tie-breaker to choose among them.
d. (e.) Prioritize patient-donor pairs in a single list. Choose the w-chain starting with the highest
priority pair and remove it (keep it).
A w-chain that is formed at an interim step of the procedure may grow at subsequent steps
unless it is removed; hence the immediate removal of w-chains has a potential eﬃciency cost.
Therefore the following ￿hybrid￿ of chain selection rules d. and e. may appeal to those who
wish to moderate the eﬃciency loss while increasing the in￿ow of type O living kidneys to the
cadaveric waiting list.
f. Prioritize the patient-donor pairs so that pairs with type O donor have higher priorities
than those who do not. Choose the w-chain starting with the highest priority pair; remove
it in case the pair has a type O donor but keep it otherwise.
3.3 Eﬃciency and Incentives
In what follows, we will speak of Pareto eﬃciency in terms of the agents in the kidney exchange
problem, namely the paired patients and donors who are available to participate in the kidney
exchange. Given a kidney exchange problem, a matching is Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other
matching which is weakly preferred by all patients and donors and strictly preferred by at least
one patient-donor pair. A kidney exchange mechanism is eﬃcient if it always selects a Pareto
eﬃcient matching among the participants present at any given time.
Theorem 1 Consider a chain selection rule such that any w-chain selected at a non-terminal
round remains in the procedure and thus the kidney at its tail remains available for the next
round. The TTCC mechanism, implemented with any such chain selection rule, is eﬃcient.
Chain selection rules that remove a selected w-chain before termination of the algorithm,
on the contrary, may yield Pareto ineﬃcient outcomes.
Roth [1982] showed for the housing model that truthful preference revelation is a dominant
strategy o ft h ep r e f e r e n c er e v e l a t i o ng a m ei n d u c e dby the TTC mechanism, and hence an agent
11can never pro￿t by misrepresenting his preferences. Recall that, in the absence of indirect
exchanges, the static kidney exchange problem is a housing market, and therefore the Roth
[1982] result immediately applies.6 When indirect exchanges are allowed, whether the TTCC
mechanism is strategy-proof depends on the choice of the chain selection rule.
Theorem 2 Consider the chain selection rules a, d, e, and f. The TTCC mechanism, imple-
mented with any of these chain selection rules, is strategy-proof.
Among these four chain selection rules, the last two are especially appealing: Rule e yields an
eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism, whereas Rule f gives up eﬃciency in order to increase
the in￿ow of type O kidneys to the cadaveric waiting list. On the negative side, strategy-
proofness of TTCC is lost if one adopts a chain selection rule that chooses among the longest
w-chains.
Example 2: Consider the problem in Example 1, but suppose patient t4 misrepresents his
preferences as P 0
4 = k5,k 1,k 9,... improving the ranking of kidney k1. While Round 1 and
Round 2 remain as in Example 1, Round 3 changes and this time the longest w-chain at Round
3i sW4 =( k8,t 8,k 4,t 4,k 1,t 1,k 9,t 9). Therefore patient t4 is assigned kidney k1 instead of kidney
k8, making his preference misrepresentation pro￿table. ♦
4 Simulations
The theoretical treatment of the TTCC mechanism makes clear that larger exchanges may yield
welfare gains, but it gives no idea of their magnitude. The following simulations are meant as
a ￿rst step in that direction, and as a ￿proof of concept￿ to demonstrate that the gains are
potentially substantial. We use data where it exists, e.g. on the likelihood of mismatches and
positive crossmatches (see Table 2). Where no data exist￿on the willingness of patients and
donors to trade a live donation for priority on the cadaver queue￿we do robustness checks by
simulating a wide range of preferences.
Patient and Donor Characteristics: In addition to characteristics reported in Table 2, for
the HLA characteristics of the population, we use the distribution reported in Zenios [1996]
using the UNOS registration data for years between 1987 and 1991. We assume that all HLA
proteins and blood-type are independently distributed following Zenios [1996]. For simplicity,
we consider unrelated donor-patient pairs. About 25.3% all living-donor transplants were in
6That is, at any speci￿c time, a patient cannot receive a more preferred kidney by misrepresenting his
preferences, which include his option value for the possibility that his donor￿s kidney can be used in a future
exchange. We emphasize that of course we speak of strategy proofness in the limited strategy space, the space
of stated preferences, we have modeled for the kidney exchange problem. There may remain strategic issues
associated with other aspects of the organ transplant process, such as being registered at multiple transplant
centers and hence appearing on multiple regional waiting lists.
12this category in 2001. We use UNOS data to ￿nd the conditional distribution of the age of a
non-spousal unrelated donor given that he is an adult. We assume that HLA and blood-type
characteristics of the donor have the same distribution as the patients￿, the characteristics of
a non-spousal unrelated donor are independently distributed with the patient, and the charac-
teristics of a spouse are independently distributed with the patient except his or her age. We
assume that the spouse age is the same as the patient age.
Preference Construction: The preferences of patients are determined using the survival
analysis of grafts reported in Mandal et al. [2003]. This analysis uses data obtained from
￿rst-time kidney-only transplants between 1995 and 1998 in the United States Renal Data
System (USRDS) database. We assume that the utility function of each patient depends
on the number of HLA mismatches (x) and the donor age (y). In the ￿rational￿ preference
construction, following Mandal et al. [2003], we assume that each patient younger than 60 has
a utility function u(x,y)=−0.514x −
y
10, and each patient 60 and older has a utility function
u(x,y)=−0.510x−
y
10. We also consider a ￿cautious￿ preference construction. Under cautious
preferences, we assume that patient ti prefers donor kj ∈ Ki to his own donor ki only if kidney
ki is not compatible with him, or if although kidney ki is compatible with him, it has more
than an equivalent of one additional HLA mismatch than kidney kj has.
Under both preference scenarios, the waitlist option may or may not be considered accept-
able by a patient. Since the expected quality of HLA match is very low when a patient is
given priority in the waiting list and since the graft failure rates are signi￿cantly higher for
cadaveric kidneys than living-donor kidneys, we assume that a patient considers the waitlist
option acceptable only if his donor is not compatible with him. We also assume that the
patients who consider this option acceptable prefer any compatible living-donor kidney to this
option. Because there is no reliable data available on the rate of patients who consider this
option acceptable and because it depends on how priority is given, we consider two treatments,
in which 0% and 40% of the patients with incompatible donors prefer the waitlist option to
their own donors.
Simulated Mechanisms: We consider four exchange mechanisms to contrast with the no-
exchange regime: (1) Paired-kidney-exchange mechanism,( 2 )TTC mechanism,( 3 )paired and
indirect exchange mechanism,a n d( 4 )TTCC mechanism with the eﬃcient and strategy-proof
chain selection rule e. In our simulations, we randomly simulate a sample of n donor-patient
pairs using the population characteristics explained above. Then, we determine the preferences
of patients over kidneys in the sample: For each patient ti,w e￿rst check whether a donor
kj is ABO-compatible. If kj is ABO-compatible, then we check whether there is a positive
crossmatch between ti and kj. If they test negative for crossmatch, then kj is in the compatible
donor set Ki of patient ti.A f t e r￿nding the set of compatible kidneys for each patient, we obtain
a preference ordering on this set, using the utility functions described above. We construct 4
sets of preferences for each patient using the rational or cautious preference construction and
assuming that 0% or 40% of patients with incompatible donors consider the waitlist option
13acceptable. We simulate each of the ￿ve mechanisms under these four preference scenarios. We
use a Monte-Carlo simulation size of 100 trials for three diﬀerent population sizes of 30, 100,
and 300 pairs.
Discussion of Results: The simulation results suggest that substantial gains in the number
and match quality of transplanted kidneys might result from adoption of the TTCC mechanism.
We report the details of this analysis in 3 tables. The rows of the tables refer to diﬀerent regimes,
under diﬀerent preference constructions, and diﬀerent population sizes.
Table 3 reports the general patient statistics under each regime. The ￿rst column reports the
total live donor transplants as percentage of the population size, which is the sum of next two
columns, transplants from own compatible donor and transplants from trades. The forth column
is the percentage of patients upgraded to the top of the waitlist through indirect exchanges. The
￿fth column reports the quality of matches in the live donor transplants: The lower the HLA
mismatch is, the higher the odds of graft survival. Standard errors are reported below the
estimates.
I nT a b l e4 ,w er e p o r tt h ee ﬀect of each regime on the waitlist additions for each blood type.
The columns are separated into two main groups. The ￿rst group reports the net percentage
of patients sent to the top of the waitlist due to indirect exchanges (the percentages are taken
with respect to all paired patients). This is a net upgrade burden, i.e. the diﬀerence between
the patients added at the top of the list and the living-donor kidneys made available for the
waitlist patients. The second group reports (again as a percentage of all paired patients) the
rate of paired patients who nonetheless are sent to the cadaveric waiting list because the patient
is not assigned a living-donor kidney.
In Table 5, we report the sizes of cycles and w-chains under each mechanism. The columns
are divided into two groups for cycles and w-chains. Each group reports the number, the average
length, the average maximum (per group, over all 100 trials) length of cycles/w-chains and the
length of the longest cycle/w-chain encountered in all 100 trials. The lengths of cycles/w-chains
are measured in pairs. Standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Next we highlight a number of these results:
1. A transition to the TTCC mechanism will signi￿cantly improve the utilization rate of
potential unrelated living-donor kidneys: Assuming a population size of 100 pairs, while
approximately 55% of potential living-donor kidneys are utilized under the no-exchange
regime, this rate increases to 73.5% under the paired-kidney-exchange, and to 88-89.5%
under the TTCC mechanism. The eﬃciency gain gets larger as the population size grows
further.
2. A transition to TTCC signi￿cantly decreases the HLA mismatch, especially for the large
populations.
3. Under the TTCC mechanism, average/maximal sizes of cycles/w-chains increase as the
population grows although the increase is less than proportional.
144. Type O patients without living donors bene￿t from the TTCC mechanism. The TTCC
mechanism signi￿cantly reduces the incidence of type O patients with potential donors
who are forced to rely on the cadaveric waiting list because of an incompatibility. Consider
a population size of 100 donor-recipient pairs (with the distribution of blood types, etc.
of the UNOS dataset). When no exchange is allowed, on average 27.6 type O patients
who have a willing donor nevertheless join the waiting list for a cadaver kidney because
they are incompatible (by blood type or positive crossmatch) with their donor. This rate
reduces to 21.9 under the paired-kidney-exchange and further to 5.5-5.7 under the TTCC
mechanism. That means out of 100 patients with living donors, 16.2-16.4 patients with
O blood types drop out of competition for cadaver kidneys as a result of a change from
paired-kidney-exchange to the TTCC mechanism. The corresponding cost of this change
to type O patients with no living donors is that only 3.5-4.2 type O patients with living
donors are moved to the head of the cadaver queue.7 So the reduction in demand for O
type cadaver kidneys is much larger than the number of patients who are inserted at the
head of the queue.8
More detail on the simulations can be found in Roth, S¤ onmez & ¤ Unver [2003].
5 Conclusion
The TTCC mechanism is motivated by the present small scale pilot paired and indirect kidney
exchange programs. We have concentrated here on its advantages over the simplest kinds of
exchange. But, as we begin to talk with members of the transplantation community about ￿rst
steps towards implementing such exchanges, it is clear that there are obstacles to be overcome.
Some are the same obstacles that have kept existing exchange programs very small. Among
these are the absence of registries of incompatible or poorly matched patient-donor pairs.9 Also,
7This bene￿t/cost rate is signi￿cantly better than the bene￿t/cost rate that results from a change from
paired-kidney-exchange to paired/indirect-kidney-exchange because, in an indirect exchange, only occasionally
will a type O living donor kidney be sent to the waiting list to compensate for the type O patient who receives
priority on the queue. In our simulations with 100 paired patients, a transition from paired-kidney-exchange to
paired/indirect-kidney-exchange drops 21.89-13.42=8.47 patients from the waiting list at a cost of moving 8.25
paired patients to the head of the cadaver queue.
8We emphasize that the welfare implications of this fort y p eOp a t i e n t so nt h ec a d a v e rq u e u ei sm u c hc l e a r e r
when we think of patients who enter the queue after kidney exchange is already well established. There can still
be important welfare concerns about individual patients during the transition to an indirect exchange regime,
since an O type patient who has already been on the waiting list for three years receives relatively less bene￿t
from the reduction in new O type patients joining the list than does a new patient, but suﬀers increased waiting
time when an O type patient is given higher priority on the queue. What the simulations suggest is that, once
a kidney exchange regime is up and running, type O patients without a living donor who enter the queue for a
cadaver kidney will be helped, not harmed, by the fact that exchanges are being made.
9Such a registry would need to include tissue typing data, and present medical privacy laws mean that
this will be diﬃcult to collect ex-post. We have begun exploratory discussions with our medical colleagues
15exchanges require coordination of multiple operating rooms and surgical teams, two for each
patient-donor pair, so larger exchanges will require more coordination.
As a registry starts to be assembled, it may be that the main initial advantage will simply
be to allow paired exchanges to be conducted more often. However as the registry grows
larger, and the practical diﬃculties are overcome, we have seen that there will be additional
bene￿ts to be reaped from more ￿exible forms of exchange that enlarge the set of possible
exchanges. Compared to simple paired and indirect exchanges, the wider exchange implemented
by the TTCC mechanism creates additional welfare gains in several ways. First, allowing longer
cycles of exchange will allow some transplantations that could not be arranged with pairwise
exchanges, and it will increase the scope for improving the quality of the resulting matches. And
by allowing more live donations, it will reduce the competition for cadaver kidneys. Second,
longer chains for combined indirect and paired exchange will allow an indirect exchange to
bene￿t more than one patient-donor pair, and by doing so will also increase the number of
live donations. And third, by increasing the number of O type patients who can receive live
donations, and by managing the ￿ow of kidneys and patients to the cadaver queue, this can be
done in ways that help O type patients who have no live donor.10
In summary, the design of practical exchange mechanisms is the ￿engineering￿ part of eco-
nomic theory, and must deal with constraints omitted from more abstract endeavors. The
organization of a kidney exchange faces some of the most stringent constraints we have en-
countered, arising from social/legal/ethical concerns, as well as from the practical requirements
of kidney transplantation and patient care. In the future, some of those constraints may be
relaxed, e.g. through advances in dealing with immunological incompatibilities, or in using
xenotransplants (animal organs) to relieve the organ shortage, or through some other way of
radically increasing organ availability. In the meantime, increasing kidney exchange among
willing donor-recipient pairs oﬀers a way to bene￿t those pairs who are not well matched, and,
by increasing live organ donation and reducing competition for cadaver organs, also bene￿ting
patients who do not have live donors. This bene￿ti ss u ﬃciently widespread that it helps even
the most vulnerable patients, the type O patients without a live donor.
in New England about the possibility of developing a program to identify incompatible and poorly matched
patient-donor pairs, and collect tissue typing data from potential donors.
10T oe l i m i n a t eo rr e d u c et h ea d v e r s ea ﬀect of indirect exchange programs on patients with no living donors,
Zenios, Woodle & Ross [2001] propose preferential selection of O blood-type paired donors for patients with
multiple potential donors who wish to participate in indirect exchange programs. Their proposal is consistent
with a direct extension of the TTCC mechanism to a model with multiple potential donors when the ￿exibility
on chain selection is used to increase the in￿ow of O blood-type kidneys to the cadaveric waiting list. See Roth,
S¤ onmez and ¤ Unver [2003] for more on exchange when patients may have multiple potential donors.
16AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a graph where each patient points either towards a kidney
or w, and each kidney points to its paired recipient. Suppose there is no cycle. Consider an
arbitrary pair (ki,t i). Start with kidney ki and follow the path in the graph. Since there are
no cycles, no kidney or patient can be encountered twice. Hence by the ￿niteness of pairs, the
path shall terminate at w. This is the w-chain initiated by pair (ki,t i) completing the proof. ♦
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 : Let the TTCC mechanism be implemented with a chain selection
rule such that any w-chain selected at a non-terminal round remains in the procedure and
the kidney at its tail remains available for the next round. Any patient whose assignment is
￿n a l i z e di nR o u n d1h a sr e c e i v e dh i st o pc h o i c ea n dc a n n o tb em a d eb e t t e ro ﬀ.A n yp a t i e n t
whose assignment is ￿nalized in Round 2 has received his top choice among the kidneys not
already assigned as part of an exchange (since chains are not removed, so the kidney at their tail
remains available), and cannot be made better oﬀ without hurting a patient whose assignment
was ￿nalized in Round 1. Proceeding in a similar way, no patient can be made better oﬀ
without hurting a patient whose assignment is ￿nalized in an earlier round. Therefore TTCC
mechanism selects a Pareto eﬃcient matching at any given time provided that w-chains are
removed at the termination. ♦
We will prove Theorem 2 for the chain selection rule a and for a class of ￿priority chain
selection rules￿ that covers rules d, e, and f. Under this class each ordering of patient-donor
pairs together with a ￿xed pair de￿nes a chain selection rule, and it is given as follows: Order
donor-patient pairs in a single priority list. Fix a pair (kj,t j). Whenever a w-chain is to be
selected, select the w-chain starting with the highest priority pair (ki,t i), and remove the w-
chain if the pair (ki,t i)h a sstrictly higher priority than the ￿xed pair (kj,t j)a n dk e e pi tu n t i l
termination otherwise.
First, we prove the following lemma which will be useful for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 2 Consider the TTCC mechanism implemented with a priority based chain selection
rule. Fix the stated preferences of all patients except patient ti at P−i. Suppose that in the
algorithm the assignment of patient ti is ￿nalized at Round s under Pi and at Round s0 under
P 0
i. Suppose s ≤ s0. Then the remaining active patients and unassigned kidneys at the beginning
of Round s are the same, whether patient ti announces Pi or P 0
i.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :P a t i e n tti fails to participate in a cycle or a selected w-chain prior to
Round s under either preferences. Therefore at any round prior to Round s not only the
highest priority active patient is the same, whether patient ti announces Pi or P 0
i, but also
the same cycles/w-chains form, and in case there are no cycles, the same w-chain is selected,
whether patient ti announces Pi or P 0
i. Hence the remaining active patients and unassigned
kidneys at the beginning of Round s are the same, whether patient ti announces Pi or P 0
i. ♦
17P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2:W e￿rst consider the chain selection rule a. Recall that for each patient
ti, the relevant part of preference Pi is the ranking up to ki or w, whichever is more preferred.
Given the preference pro￿le (Pi)n
i=1, construct a new preference pro￿le (P 0
i)n
i=1 as follows: For
each patient ti with kiPiw,l e tP 0
i = Pi. For each patient ti with wPiki,c o n s t r u c tP 0
i from Pi by
swapping the ranking of ki and w.N o t et h a tkiP 0
iw for each patient ti and because the relevant
part of preferences are the more preferred of ki and w, h{(ki,t i)}n
i=1,(P0
i)n
i=1i, is a housing
market. Let ￿ denote the outcome of the TTC mechanism for this housing market and construct
matching ν from matching ￿ as follows: If P0
i 6= Pi and ￿(ti)=ki then ν(ti)=w, otherwise
ν(ti)=￿(ti). The key observation is that ν is the outcome of the TTCC mechanism when
it is implemented with the minimal w-chain selecting chain selection rule. Therefore by Roth
[1982], a patient can never receive a more preferred kidney by a preference misrepresentation.
He can receive the waitlist option w by a misrepresentation but cannot pro￿t from it. That
is because the TTCC mechanism never assigns a patient a kidney that is inferior to w. Hence
TTCC is strategy-proof with this choice of chain selection rule.
Next consider any of the priority based chain selection rules. Consider a patient ti with true
preferences Pi. Fix an announced preference pro￿le P−i f o ra l lo t h e rp a t i e n t s .W ew a n tt os h o w
that revealing his true preferences Pi is at least as good as announcing any other preferences
P 0
i under the TTCC mechanism. Let s and s0 be the rounds at which patient ti leaves the
algorithm under Pi and P 0
i respectively. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1: s<s 0. By Lemma 2, the same kidneys remain in the algorithm at the beginning of
Round s whether patient ti announces Pi or P 0
i. Moreover, patient ti is assigned his top choice
remaining at Round s under Pi. Therefore his assignment under Pi is at least as good as his
assignment under P0
i.
Case 2: s ≥ s0. After announcing P 0
i, the assignment of patient ti is ￿nalized either by joining
a cycle, or by joining a selected w-chain. We will consider the two cases separately.
Case 2a: The assignment of patient ti is ￿nalized by joining a cycle under P 0
i.
Let (k1,t 1,k2,...,kr,t i)b et h ec y c l ep a t i e n tti joins, and thus k1 b et h ek i d n e yh ei sa s s i g n e d
under P 0
i. Next suppose he reveals his true preferences Pi. Consider Round s0.B yL e m m a2 ,
the same active patients and available kidneys remain at the beginning of this round whether
patient ti announces P 0
i or Pi. Therefore at Round s0,k i d n e yk1 points to patient t1,p a t i e n t
t1 points to kidney k2, ...,k i d n e ykr points to patient ti. Moreover, they keep on doing so as
long as patient ti remains. Since patient ti truthfully points to his best remaining choice at
each round, he either receives a kidney better than kidney k1 or eventually points to kidney k1,
completes the formation of cycle (k1,t 1,k2,...,k r,t i), and gets assigned kidney k1.
Case 2b: The assignment of patient ti is ￿nalized by joining a selected w-chain under P 0
i.
Let (k1,t 1,k 2,...,k r,t i = tr,k r+1,...,kr+m,t r+m) be the selected w-chain patient ti joins,
where r ≥ 1a n dm ≥ 0, under P 0
i. Therefore, under P 0
i,p a t i e n tti is assigned the kidney kr+1
if m ≥ 1a n dt h ew a i t l i s to p t i o nw if m = 0. Also note that, given the considered class of
priority based chain selection rules, pair (k1,t 1)i st h eh i g h e s tp r i o r i t yp a i ri nR o u n ds0.N e x t
18suppose patient ti reveals his true preferences Pi. Consider Round s0. By Lemma 2, the same
active patients and available kidneys remain at the beginning of this round whether patient ti
announces P 0
i or Pi. We will complete the proof by showing that, upon announcing his truthful
preferences Pi, the assignment of patient ti is ￿nalized in Round s0 a n dt h u sh ei sa s s i g n e dh i s
top choice available at the beginning of Round s0: Recall that for this case there is no cycle
in Round s0 when patient ti announces P 0
i. Therefore when he announces his true preferences
Pi, either there is no cycle in Round s0 or there is one cycle that includes him. If it is the
latter, then his assignment is ￿n a l i z e di nR o u n ds0 and we are done. Otherwise, each pair
initiates a w-chain by Lemma 1 and one of these w - c h a i n sh a st ob es e l e c t e d .B yt h ec h o i c eo fa
priority based chain selection rule, this will be the w-chain that starts with the highest priority
pair (k1,t 1). But the path starting with kidney k1 passes through patient ti and therefore the
selected w-chain includes patient ti. Hence in this case as well his assignment is ￿nalized in
Round s0 completing the proof. ♦
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20Table 1: US Kidney Transplants. The data for years 1992-2001 are constructed from the an-
nual report of UNOS/OPTN, the data for 2002 are constructed from the national database
of UNOS/OPTN. National database numbers are slightly higher than the annual report num-
bers due to continuous updating regarding previous years. Number of registrations may have
multiple counts of patients since one patient may have registered in multiple centers for the
waitlist.
Year Cadaveric Cadaveric Live All Waitlist New Waitlist
Donors Transplants Donors Patients Additions
1992 4,276 7,202 2,535 22,063 15,224
1993 4,609 7,509 2,851 24,765 16,090
1994 4,797 7,638 3,009 27,258 16,538
1995 5,003 7,690 3,377 30,590 17,903
1996 5,038 7,726 3,649 34,000 18,328
1997 5,083 7,769 3,912 37,438 19,067
1998 5,339 8,017 4,361 40,931 20,191
1999 5,386 8,023 4,552 43,867 20,986
2000 5,490 8,089 5,324 47,596 22,269
2001 5,528 8,202 5,924 51,144 22,349
2002 5,630 8,534 6,233 54,844 23,494
21Table 2: American Caucasian patient and living donor characetristic distributions used in
simulations. The frequencies are obtained from the UNOS data for various years. Patients are
the new waitlist additions recorded between January 1995 and April 2003, except the gender
data. The gender and living donor data were recorded between 1992 and 2001. Based on
UNOS/OPTN data and annual report as of 7/14/2003 retrieved from http://www.optn.org.
Positive crossmatch probability is reported by Zenios, Woodle & Ross [2001].
A. Patient ABO Blood Type Frequency
O 45.6%
A 39.5%
B 11.1%
AB 3.8%
B. Patient Gender Frequency
Female 40.9%
Male 59.1%
C. Patient Age Frequency
<18 5.6%
18￿34 13%
35￿49 34.9%
50￿64 38.9%
>64 7.6%
D. Unrelated Living Donors Frequency
Spouse 53.5%
Other 46.5%
E. Living Donor Age Frequency
<18 5.6%
18￿34 13%
35￿49 34.9%
50￿64 38.9%
>64 7.6%
F. Positive Crossmatch Frequency
Female Patient - Husband 33.3%
Other 11.1%
22Table 3: Number of Transplants and Quality of Match for n=30, n=100, and n=300
Pop. Pref. Exchange Total Own Donor Trade% Waitlist HLA
Size Regime Trans.% Trans.% Upgrade% Mis.
Waitlist 0%
All None 54.83 54.83 0 0 4.79
(8.96) (8.96) (0) (0) (0.25)
All Paired 68.50 54.83 13.67 0 4.78
(9.90) (8.96) (9.40) (0) (0.24)
Rational TTC 82.47 23.03 59.43 0 4.16
(10.14) (9.44) (13.57) (0) (0.22)
Cautious TTC 81.07 34.17 46.90 0 4.29
n=30 (10.02) (11.27) (13.96) (0) (0.23)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 68.50 54.83 13.67 13.20 4.78
(9.90) (8.96) (9.40) (6.73) (0.24)
Rational TTCC e 84.70 21.23 63.47 6.37 4.17
(8.49 9.60) (12.39) (4.88) (0.22)
Cautious TTCC e 83.57 32.93 50.63 6.13 4.29
(8.53) (10.98) (12.54) (4.39) (0.22)
Waitlist 0%
All None 54.79 54.79 0 0 4.83
(4.48) (4.48) (0) (0) (0.14)
All Paired 73.59 54.79 18.80 0 4.82
(4.97) (4.48) (3.81) (0) (0.11)
Rational TTC 87.85 11.51 76.34 0 3.72
(4.54) (3.44) (5.45) (0) (0.10)
Cautious TTC 87.23 24.01 63.22 0 3.86
n=100 (4.73) (4.48) (5.46) (0) (0.11)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 73.59 54.79 18.80 10.24 4.82
(4.97) (4.48) (3.81) (3.07) (0.11)
Rational TTCC e 89.44 10.29 79.15 3.96 3.71
(3.85) (3.26) (4.40) (1.97) (0.10)
Cautious TTCC e 88.97 22.81 66.16 4.72 3.85
(4.17) (4.83) (4.79) (2.60) (0.11)
Waitlist 0%
All None 53.92 53.92 0 0 4.81
(2.82) (2.82) (0) (0) (0.08)
All Paired 75.03 53.92 21.11 0 4.81
(2.72) (2.82) (2.51) (0) (0.07)
Rational TTC 91.05 5.72 85.32 0 3.29
(3.35) (1.28) (3.61) (0) (0.06)
Cautious TTC 90.86 15.36 75.51 0 3.40
n=300 (3.31) (2.20) (4.07) (0) (0.06)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 75.03 53.92 21.11 9.77 4.81
(2.72) (2.82) (2.51) (1.73) (0.07)
Rational TTCC e 92.29 5.00 87.29 3.02 3.29
(2.98) (1.29) (3.05) (1.36) (0.06)
Cautious TTCC e 92.17 14.42 77.75 3.19 3.39
(2.93) (2.10) (3.26) (1.40) (0.06)
23Table 4: ABO Composition of Net Waitlist Upgrades and Other Waitlist Patients as Percentage
of n=30, n=100, and n=300. Net Waitlist Upgrades is the diﬀerence between the number of
upgraded patients of certain blood type and the number of live donor kidneys sent to the
waitlist of the same blood type.
Pop. Pref. Exchange Net Waitlist Upgrades% Other Waitlist Additions%
Size Regime O A B AB Total O A B AB Total
Waitlist 0%
All None 0 0 0 0 0 28.83 10.13 5.77 0.43 45.17
All Paired 0 0 0 0 0 24.50 4.07 2.80 0.13 31.50
Rational TTC 0 0 0 0 0 12.47 3.17 1.77 0.13 17.53
n=30 Cautious TTC 0 0 0 0 0 13.77 3.17 1.87 0.13 18.93
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 9.10 -6.33 -1.23 -1.53 0 14.67 2.20 1.37 0.07 18.30
Rational TTCC e 5.13 -2.47 -1.07 -1.60 0 7.13 1.17 0.63 0.00 8.93
Cautious TTCC e 4.90 -2.23 -1.23 -1.43 0 8.70 0.83 0.77 0.00 10.30
Waitlist 0%
All None 0 0 0 0 0 27.64 11.18 5.86 0.53 45.21
All Paired 0 0 0 0 0 21.89 2.90 1.57 0.05 26.41
Rational TTC 0 0 0 0 0 9.30 1.90 0.91 0.04 12.15
n=100 Cautious TTC 0 0 0 0 0 9.78 2.00 0.95 0.04 12.77
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 8.25 -5.27 -1.70 -1.28 0 13.42 1.62 1.08 0.05 16.17
Rational TTCC e 3.49 -1.17 -1.07 -1.25 0 5.71 0.46 0.42 0.01 6.60
Cautious TTCC e 4.21 -1.56 -1.12 -1.53 0 5.50 0.41 0.40 0.00 6.31
Waitlist 0%
All None 0 0 0 0 0 28.32 11.42 5.79 0.55 46.08
All Paired 0 0 0 0 0 21.70 2.19 1.06 0.02 24.97
Rational TTC 0 0 0 0 0 7.07 1.34 0.52 0.01 8.95
n=300 Cautious TTC 0 0 0 0 0 7.23 1.37 0.52 0.01 9.14
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 8.40 -5.65 -1.42 -1.32 0 13.21 1.36 0.63 0.01 15.21
Rational TTCC e 2.77 -0.87 -0.63 -1.27 0 4.28 0.23 0.18 0.00 4.69
Cautious TTCC e 2.94 -0.96 -0.63 -1.34 0 4.28 0.21 0.15 0.00 4.64
24Table 5: Properties of Cycles and W-chains for n=30, n=100, and n=300. Cycles of 1 pair
length with an incompatible donor-patient pair are not counted.
Pop. Pref. Exchange Cycles W-chains
Size Regime Number Length (as pairs) Number Length (as pairs)
Mean Max. Longest Mean Max Longest
Waitlist 0%
All None 16.45 1 1 1 0 - - -
(2.69) (0) (0) (0)
All Paired 18.50 1.11 1.90 2 0 - - -
(2.46) (0.08) (0.30) (0)
Rational TTC 14.65 2.95 5.65 9 0 - - -
(2.22) (0.43) (1.15) (0)
Cautious TTC 16.79 2.59 5.42 10 0 - - -
n=30 (2.71) (0.41) (1.17) (0)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 18.50 1.11 1.90 2 3.96 1 1 1
(2.46) (0.08) (0.30) (2.02) (0) (0)
Rational TTCC e 13.37 3.04 5.65 9 1.91 1.86 2.55 7
(2.50) (0.47) (1.15) (1.46) (0.83) (1.35)
Cautious TTCC e 15.74 2.62 5.42 10 1.84 1.81 2.26 6
(2.75) (0.44) (1.17) (1.32) (0.68) (1.01)
Waitlist 0%
All None 54.79 1 1 1 0 - - -
(4.48) (0) (0) (0)
All Paired 64.19 1.15 2.00 2 0 - - -
(4.33) (0.03) (0.00) (0)
Rational TTC 36.53 4.22 10.14 15 0 - - -
(3.44) (0.41) (1.65) (0)
Cautious TTC 45.53 3.51 9.82 17 0 - - -
n=100 (4.29) (0.33) (1.81) (0)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 64.19 1.15 2.00 2 10.24 1 1 1
(4.33) (0.03) (0.00) (3.07) (0) (0)
Rational TTCC e 32.91 4.41 10.14 15 3.96 2.40 3.96 11
(4.16) (0.43) (1.65) (1.97) (0.93) (1.97)
Cautious TTCC e 42.00 3.61 9.82 17 4.72 2.17 3.76 10
(5.43) (0.39) (1.81) (2.60) (0.65) (1.64)
Waitlist 0%
All None 161.76 1 1 1 0 - - -
(8.47) (0) (0) (0)
All Paired 193.42 1.16 2.00 2 0 - - -
(7.42) (0.02) (0.00) (0)
Rational TTC 79.54 5.98 16.84 26 0 - - -
(4.91) (0.43) (2.41) (0)
Cautious TTC 102.14 4.89 16.00 22 0 - - -
n=300 (7.00) (0.33) (2.00) (0)
Waitlist 40%
All Paired/Ind. 193.42 1.16 2.00 2 29.30 1 1 1
(7.42) (0.02) (0.00) (5.18) (0) (0)
Rational TTCC e 71.17 6.30 16.84 26 9.05 2.88 6.47 15
(5.88) (0.46) (2.41) (4.07) (0.78) (2.40)
Cautious TTCC e 93.76 5.05 16.00 22 9.57 2.65 5.99 12
(7.51) (0.33) (2.00) (4.20) (0.72) (2.23)
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Figure 1: Example 1, Round 1. There is a single cycle C1 =( k11,t 11,k 3,t 3,k 2,t 2). Remove the
cycle by assigning k11 to t2, k3 to t11,a n dk2 to t3.
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Figure 2: Example 1, Round 2. Upon removing cycle C1,an e wc y c l eC2 =( k7,t 7,k 6,t 6,k 5,t 5)
forms. Remove it by assigning k7 to t5, k6 to t7,a n dk5 to t6.
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Figure 3: Example 1, Round 3. No new cycle forms and hence each kidney-patient pair starts
a w-chain. The longest w-chains are W1=(k8,t 8,k 4,t 4,k 9,t 9)a n dW2 =( k10,t 10,k 1,t 1,k 9,t 9).
Since t1, the highest priority patient, is in W2 but not in W1,c h o o s ea n d￿x W2. Assign w to
t9, k9 to t1,a n dk1 to t10 but do not remove them. Kidney k10,t h ek i d n e ya tt h et a i lo fW2,
remains available for the next round.
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Figure 4: Example 1, Round 4. Upon ￿xing the w-chain W2,an e wc y c l eC3 =( k4,t 4,k 8,t 8)
forms. Remove it by assigning k4 to t8 and k8 to t4.
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Figure 5: Example 1, Round 5. No new cycles form and the pair (k12,t 12) ￿joins￿ W2 from its
tail to form the longest w-chain W3 =( k12,t 12,k 10,t 10,k 1,t 1,k 9,t 9). Fix W3 and assign k10 to
t12. Since no patient is left, w-chain W3 is removed and kidney k12 at its tail is oﬀered to the
highest priority patient at the cadaveric waiting list.
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